Hi Jean65,

I've not read the TLS, but I suppose Kant's claim is strong because Classical Theists claim that God is a broadly necessary being. That is to say that God is the ground of all modalities. I don't want to say that anyone who says that God doesn't exist is contradicting themselves (this is the force of the critique). However, I would preserve the primacy of God by arguing that he is a broadly logical necessity, to the extent that he is the cause of all being(s), as well as possible beings. Classical Theists argue for why this being must be called God by appealing to their specific metaphysic which all seem to say the same point via different means (metaphysic), that the necessary being must be a being without any potentiality. As such, talk of possible worlds is purely formal device which proceed from the experiences of our world as how it is, rather than how it seems to us.

Kant's critique, I think, is effective if we do not make further distinctions on how we use the term necessity. While Kant was busy with his a priori business, the most of St. Thomas's work is a posteriori. But Kant had already 'dispensed' of metaphysic, so the whole enterprise is of no meaning to him. As such, by accepting his distinctions and agreeing with the critique, one could realise that necessity can only mean something this tight, where if one can conceive against it, it isn't necessary. 

You might want to take a look at this as well. Whether God is necessary or not, is an a posteriori matter, not a priori. We will say that the notion of necessity is metaphysically realised when we see that the non-existence of a Necessary Being is a state of affairs that is never obtained, and in fact, unobtainable, as such, he is an entity that is broadly logically necessary.

The idea that a Necessary being is metaphysically ultimate, concerns itself with something which is already existing, and demonstrable via reason. We can't say the same about the ontological argument since it tries to argue from the attribute of metaphysical ultimacy into the existence of a necessary being which we haven't yet established. We can establish God's existence a posteriori form reason, but Kant says that from that we cannot establish what kind of attributes such a thing (necessary being) has. But why not? He denies that reason can do, what the Classical Theists claim that it does. He has a ton of objections here, let us know which ones you want to deal with. Don't be shy to ask .

A short answer - Kant's objections to the Cosmological Argument only make sense in the context of his own philosophical system (the Phenomena/Noumena distinction, the transcendental categories, space and time as forms of intuition and so forth), which very few modern philosophers accept. Ed did not discuss those objections in The Last Superstition because so few philosophers still bother with them*. So if someone wants to give the full Kantian objections they can but the onus will be on them as critic to justify the entire philosophical frame-work on which it rests.

*For instance I can't think of one modern philosopher of religion who holds that the Cosmological Argument depends on the Ontological. There are and have been many philosophers who accepted one of those arguments without accepting the other.

Kant's criticisms of the Cosmological Argument have been discussed a number of times on these forums, often in connection with weaker popular versions. For a sample see the following:

http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?id=352

Other factors: as is welknown Kant's objection to the Ontological Argument is only valid against some versions anyway, and even there its disputed (for what it's worth I think the strongest reading oen can give to the Kantian objection is by reading it in reverse i.e. if Existence were a property then Non-Existence would be too ergo we would be commited to Meinongianism). More here:

http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?id=325&p=1

Last edited by DanielCC (3/16/2016 6:07 am)

Thanks for your answers.
As I understand  what has been said, Kant's claim that we cannot infer from change to a necessary being largely depends on this whole philosophical system.
But I am struggling thereafter.
It seems that there are several points there.
First, Kant, it seems to me, says that, once we got the necessary being (NB), if we want do demonstrate that it is God, this fact is demonstrated by the ontalogical argument (OA).
Secondly, I have the impression that Kant implicitly says, that if we want to equate to infer from NB to God, and even if we don't use OA, we are using the same "style" of reasoning that OA is using.
Thirdly, I don't really grasp the whole discussion around the concept of necessity, and it appear that it is crucial here.

Jean65 wrote:

I think I'm struggling a bit to understand why, according to Kant, the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument. Is there a accessible introduction to this problem in order to help me to understand?

Kant assumes that the only reason why we take the necessary being of the Cosmological Argument to have the Divine Attributes we commonly associate with God is by taking the Ontological Argument in reverse, to witt the OA (as Kant understands it) holds that a perfect being is a necessary being - in the case of the Cosmological Argument we allegedly take the perfect being = necessary being conclusion and flip it round the other way, assuming that any necessary being must be a perfect being. Kant contests that without the truth of the OA we cannot accept that conclusion ergo the Cosmological Argument cannot get us to God.

Last edited by DanielCC (3/22/2016 5:35 pm)