I'm sympathetic to a certain extent, but what exactly is your metaphysical view? That there is only the productions of individual minds?

This reply is inappropriately long. I've been asked to write about related subjects a few times, had scraps laying around my desktop, and hate to waste material. I hope you don't mind. I'm also leaving the positive case for hylemorphic dualism, as opposed to against subjective idealism (phenomenalism), to someone else.

I'm going to call what some people refer to as sense data, sense impressions. Moore and Russell talked about sense data. They wanted to leave open the question of whether there exists unsensed sensibilia. I suspect, however, that you and I agree that senses are had only when there is a mind to have them, and sense impression reflects this better.

I'm also going to need the distinction between intentional content and intentional objects. Two perceptual experiences can have exactly the same content, where one has an object and the other doesn't. The veridical perception of an apple has an object; the hallucination of an apple doesn't. The content of the perception is satisfied; the content of the hallucination isn't satisfied.

I actually think phenomenalism is unmotivated. For example, the main argument for it seems to be from parsimony:

(1) Phenomenalism is more economical than indirect realism.
(2) Direct realism is incorrect.
(3) If direct realism is incorrect and phenomenalism is more economical than indirect realism, we ought to prefer phenomenalism as our best theory.
(4) Hence, we ought to prefer phenomenalism as our best theory.

There is a host of arguments for (2), but they nearly all take the form of what John Searle calls The Bad Argument:

(5) In both the veridical (good) case and in the hallucination (bad) case, there is a common element—a qualitative objective visual experience going on in the visual system.
(6) Because the common element is qualitatively identical in the two cases, whatever analysis we give of one, we must give of the other.
(7) In both the veridical case and the hallucination case we are aware of something (are conscious of something, see something).
(8) But in the hallucination case it cannot be a material object; therefore, it must be a subjective mental entity. Just to have a name, call it a “sense impression”.
(9) But by step two we have to give the same analysis for both cases. So in the veridical case, as in the hallucination, we see only sense impressions.
(10) Because in both hallucinations and in veridical perceptions we see only sense impressions, then we have to conclude that we never see material objects or other ontologically objective phenomena. So Direct Realism is refuted.[1]

The problem is that (7) conflates two senses of “aware of”. The first sense is the “aware of” in (a) I am aware of a table. It describes an experience with the presence and features of the table as its conditions of satisfaction—that is, with the table as its intentional object. The second sense is the “aware of” in (b) I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand. With it, the experience and the object I'm aware of are identical. I'm experiencing pain and the only thing I'm aware of is that pain. So, in the first sense the content and object of the experience are distinct, whereas in the second sense the content and object of the experience are identical. 

The “aware of” The Bad Argument requires is the “aware of” in (a). In the veridical case, you're aware of (say) a table. There's intentional content and an intentional object. In the hallucinatory case, you aren't aware of anything. You're having a total hallucination. There's intentional content, but no intentional object. So, we aren't “aware of” something in the relevant sense in both the veridical and hallucinatory cases. So, (7) is false.

Since (7) is false, (2) remains unmotivated. Absent other reason for accepting (2), we have no reason to accept the argument from parsimony.


[1]This formulation of The Bad Argument is thanks to Searle. I've replaced his “sense data” with “sense impression” to reflect my first paragraph.

iwpoe wrote:

I'm sympathetic to a certain extent, but what exactly is your metaphysical view? That there is only the productions of individual minds?

Hello iwpoe, to explain the form of idealism I espouse in more detail: I believe that there exist numerous distinct minds, and the experiences of those minds (qualia), and whatever other types of mental content (beyond qualia) may exist (such as thoughts, beliefs, emotions, desires, etc.) There exist patterns in the experiences of minds. There also exist patterns across the experiences of multiple minds, correlations between the experiences of different minds. I believe that physical objects are reducible to such patterns-in-experience, or indeed are patterns-in-experience. A tree is a pattern which exists in the experiences of all the minds who perceive the tree. (I am a theist, albeit not exactly a classical one, so I would include the Mind of God among those minds which perceive the tree by having present in their experiences the pattern which the tree is.)

That's basically my ontology. I'm open to adding other elements to it (e.g. I'd willing to consider adding Platonic forms – I don't have a fixed view on whether they exist or not), but not adding mentally-irreducible matter. If I added mentally irreducible matter to it, I wouldn't be an idealist anymore, I'd be a dualist.

A couple of ways in which I see myself as differing from Berkeley:

1) He denied the existence of matter, as something unreal or illusory. I believe in the existence of matter. I just believe that it is ultimately reducible to mind. There exists both reductionist materialism and eliminativist materialism – reductionists say that mind exists but is reducible to matter, eliminativists deny the existence of mind; by analogy, I'd say that Berkeley was an eliminativist idealist (denying the existence of matter), I'd say I am a reductionist idealist (affirming the existence of matter, but insisting it is ultimately reducible to mind)

2) Berkeley argues for idealism on an epistemic basis; his arguments have been heavily criticised. I prefer to focus on different arguments for idealism instead.

Without wanting to intrude into the conversation. We can argue that chance is a mere convergence of causes. And that there's no such thing as 'chance' devoid of some sort of convergence at play. Similarly, when you say that matter is ultimately reducible to the mind, what could you mean here, other than say the mind causes the experience itself?

The mind causing a hallucination or something of that sort, makes metaphysical sense if and only if there's some way of reference in reality to distinguish it from reality itself. But let's say that you as an Idealist take the stance all of reality is just is such a projection of the mind, real, but projected and reducible to it. What exactly motivates this proposition, given that there's no way to 'test' this metaphysical speculation unless you appeal to some quantum phenomena (which some idealists like InspiringPhilosophy do), what would be the motivator? Parsimony? I'd rather undercut the argument. If Parsimony, then I suppose this makes a huge error, since while this could be said for God, I do not think this could be said for minds which have the substantial form of a human being, where the causal powers of their immaterial mind(s) is not only restricted by the form, but designated to serve the will of the person and their respective bodies.

John, could you please expand on the thing with the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles?

Last edited by Dennis (3/04/2016 5:39 am)

Hi Incessable,

Sorry for another long reply. They should start to shorten after this.

D. C. Williams has an interesting discussion of the distinction between economy of gross tonnage and true logical economy in Realism as an Inductive Hypothesis. Since parsimony plays an important role in your argument and discussions of phenomenalism generally, I hope you don't mind if I quote from it:

First, true logical economy consists in the assumption of as few independent principles as possible.

Second, logical economy therefore does not consist in assuming as small a quantity of matter as possible. Ockham's principle forbids us to multiply, not masses of stuff, not gross tonnage, but laws, formal elements, defining characters. It is not more economical, logically, to assume the operation of Aaron's rod than to assume the operation of an avalanche or a solar cataclysm, in spite of the immensely greater heft of the latter.

Third, logical economy therefore does not consist simply in assuming negative propositions in preference to affirmative. The assumption of nonexistence is not the nonexistence of an assumption. The assumption that a does not exist at all is not no assumption at all about a. The assumption that less exists is not even less of an assumption about what exists.

Fourth, and finally, logical economy does not consist in the sort of abstention from all assumptions which is merely an abstention from the inductive process. The economical hypothesis has no advantage over the uneconomical unless the former covers and explains at least as many of the facts as the latter. The law stipulates, not for mere economy, but for economical explanation.

I'm not concerned about gross tonnage, unless we get into infinites[1], and I'm not convinced that phenomenalism is more logically economical than direct realism. If anything, it seems to result in more contrived explanations (ie. your explanation of matter).


[1]Try finding a genuine metaphysical problem (one that isn't just aesthetic preference) with having a few thousand more atoms in the universe to see why.