Hello everyone,

I've been thinking more lately about the classical notion of substance. Aristotle asks (almost rhetorically it seems) the question: What can (or could) be contrary to substance? (in his Physics.)

At first, there might be things apparently contrary to it. One might think that as specific things are made or come-to-be and destroyed that necessarily substance has to have a contrary since substance would appear corruptible and even destructible; and if destructible as such, then presumably this necessitates something contrary to it. Or one might consider the specific natures of various things called substances, say, animals and think that irrational animals and rational animals are contrary and, as these are said to be substances or substantial beings, then substance has a contrary.

But if I am understanding Aristotle/A-T philosophy correctly, these ideas are mistaken. Let's start by considering that Aristotle tells us that the great philosophical question, What is being?, is really or above all the question, What is substance? If this is correct, then being and substance are virtual synonyms. So when Aristotle poses the question, What can be contrary to substance?, he is arguably asking in effect, What can be contrary to being? Of course, the only obvious candidates are or would be 'things' like non-being, non-existence or nothing, which of course are - so far as they go - things that are not. Indeed, we virtually never hear people speak of something unbeing, as if this were something that happened; as if being could unbe, but presumably we would if the initial objections had as much force as they would seem to at first. 

Moreover, the process of destruction or corruption (insofar as it involves a process) requires something existing to be in process of being destroyed and something actually destroying. To this day it is unclear if the universe could ever even in principle possibly succeed in annihilating itself entirely.

But there's more. Not only does the obvious candidate for a contrary to being seem to lack exactly what is necessary to succeed in being contrary to being (being or existence) but the second objection also misses the mark. To whatever extent it is true that rational and irrational animals (or perhaps just inanimate things) are contrary in their nature when compared to each other, neither of them are or can be contrary to substance, because if they were contrary to substance they could not be substances at all. Indeed, they could never come to be if their nature was contrary to substance as such. Perhpaps that is the reason Aristotle (in his Physics) goes so far evento deny motion (properly speaking, which is a narrower term for him than change and distinct from generation and corruption) to substance as such; it is not so much that substance changes as substance acquires a new or different substantial form. But it remains a substance and substantial throughout. Considered in this light, substance seems to take on a new priority even when compared with matter.

Now I'm only familiar with the A-T tradition here and, of course, I may well be wrong in my interpretation of Aristotle (though still, the thrust of the qestion "What can be contrary to substance?" seems to require such an interpretation, especially as it is given as almost rhetorical in the context). I was wondering if people familiar with or in the Platonic tradition might be aware of any similar thinking or points brought up by Plato or his followers along the lines of what could be contrary to substance/being (if at all); or if anyone is aware if any thinkers more in the modern tradition has raised a similar point or observation (presumably in ontology)?

Last edited by Timocrates (3/09/2016 12:02 am)