Pretty much every cosmological argument can, I think, be defended as best explanation arguments if someone wants to deny PSR or even PC. So one could just adapt leibnizian cosmological arguments, Kalam, or the thomistic cosmological arguments to fit this style. Whether or not there always have to be an explanation or a cause, I think it's pretty much incontroversial that brute facts should be a last resort. Who even accepts brute facts outside the context of cosmological arguments anyway? Certainly they should at least not be preferred when there is a potential explanation available. Regardless of whether or not we accept PSR, should we really accept that there is an unexplained infinite regress of conditioned beings causing each other where there is nothing guaranteeing the conditions necessary for any of those conditioned beings to exist? Should we just accept that the universe exists for no reason whatsoever, no explanation needed, nothing? It's clearly bullshit to me.

DanielCC wrote:

Robert Maydole's Modal Supremacy Argument would be a strong candidate (the main problem with is that it *appears* to commit one to an odd reading of the Barcan formula) as would re-tooled variations of Godel's Perfection Argument. Neither of them require any version of the PSR or PC.

Likewise maybe some form of Moral Argument?

(I think arguments from deontology and axiology are too often overlooked. The older I get the more I come to favour them over many of scholastic casual arguments)

The Supremacy and Perfection arguments look like they are in the same category as the Ontological Argument, which is something that some classical theists would reject, and aren't the type of argument I was looking for (I was mostly focusing on a posteriori, alethic ones based on concrete objects).


It is arguments such as the argument from Intelligibility, which attempts to prove the existence of God as the ground of all intelligibility from even one explicable fact, that work without PSR that are fitting here, since they have the same  "cosmological"  basis.
 

Last edited by aftermathemat (2/12/2018 4:19 pm)

aftermathemat wrote:

DanielCC wrote:

Robert Maydole's Modal Supremacy Argument would be a strong candidate (the main problem with is that it *appears* to commit one to an odd reading of the Barcan formula) as would re-tooled variations of Godel's Perfection Argument. Neither of them require any version of the PSR or PC.

Likewise maybe some form of Moral Argument?

(I think arguments from deontology and axiology are too often overlooked. The older I get the more I come to favour them over many of scholastic casual arguments)

The Supremacy and Perfection arguments look like they are in the same category as the Ontological Argument, which is something that some classical theists would reject, and aren't the type of argument I was looking for (I was mostly focusing on a posteriori, alethic ones based on concrete objects).
 

That some classical theists reject them has no bearing on the truth or falsity of such arguments though. That they are not based on concrete objections is precisely the reasons I am recommending them should you for the sake reject the PSR. Most of the arguments related to concrete objects boil down to some kind of existential dependence relation which the PSR rejected will just substitute for a brute fact.

(The problem with the Ontological Argument is that the possibility premise is unjustified, an issue which does not arise with Perfection arguments as they attempt to argue for God’s necessary existence based on the notion of pure perfections. I am not committing myself to whether such arguments work as they come with their own commitments)

Last edited by DanielCC (2/12/2018 4:31 pm)

aftermathemat wrote:

Miguel wrote:

Pretty much every cosmological argument can, I think, be defended as best explanation arguments if someone wants to deny PSR or even PC.....Should we just accept that the universe exists for no reason whatsoever, no explanation needed, nothing? It's clearly bullshit to me.

The PSR denier would simply deny the best explanation argument here because that would be to accept PSR. He would likely claim that best explanation is good in other cases where accepting a metaphysical principle is not necessary, but because a metaphysical principle such as PSR is implied in questions of existence, best explanation is rejected there since this would prove too much.


Of course, this is similar to Della Rocca's argument and how the PSR denier needs to defend explicability in realms other than existence. 


There is one empirical argument for PSR that I think avoids this issue, and it's an inductive argument on the basis of constant explicability. If we saw millions of new ravens everyday, and they were all black, we would be correct in stating that all ravens are black. The same thing happens with contingent facts because we are constantly faced with new facts all around us every day, even simple ones such as a cup standing on a table a minute ago and the cup standing on the table in the next 5 seconds all being explicable (though they have the same explanation), so it stands to reason that all contingent facts are explicable precisely because so many are. 


Because of objections to metaphysical conclusions brought about via arguments such as the one above, and the stubborn idea that brute facts are possible because they are logically possible, I think a good and interesting bet for the theist would be to make an argument for God based on the grounding on any intelligibility. Namely, if there is even one explicable fact, then we could still ask why any explicable facts are possible, and why there even is a bar of explicability such that a fact could either be brute or explicable.


I don't know if this argument is a good one or not, but it strikes me as an interesting avenue to approach, especially considering that there are other intelligibility arguments out there as well.
 

 
It can imply PSR, but if it does, so be it. The point is that without strictly needing the PSR, we can reasonably conclude that God exists (and that PSR is true). Then so much the worse for the PSR denier, and he has to come up with a non-question-begging way to reject PSR. Rejecting the best explanation argument in question because it would conclude with a metaphysical principle such as PSR is, obviously enough, *question-begging*. We can initially grant to the skeptic that PSR need not be true, but we cannot allow him to beg the question once we have independent good reasons for accepting PSR or God.

In any case, such an argument need not imply PSR either. It does if we proceed by inquiring why things esist, or why contingent things exist. But not if we limit ourselves to asking why specific things exist. For example, Stephen Davis's cosmological arguments asks why the universe exists, treating it as a sort of object so to speak (which Craig adapts) by using a limited PSR which does not include facts, only things (and also avoids the van inwagen objection). We can run his same argument as a best explanation one, taking it that God explains the existence of the universe without Him having to explain absolutely everything or anything. Richard Swinburne's inductive argument for God proceeds in similar fashion; for him, the existence of the cosmos is explained by a creator God, but Swinburne himself takes God to be a brute fact (or a "factually necessary being"). He doesn't accept psr. He's not investigating why things exist, only why the cosmos exists.

Can one even reliably deploy an argument for God (or anything) without PSR? Assuming PSR is false, there's no reason why a specific conclusion follows from certain premises. Assuming PSR is false, we could have no guarantee in any "rational" argumentation.