Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum

You are not logged in. Would you like to login or register?



12/22/2017 11:35 am  #11


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

@bmiller: thank you for citing Aquinas' commentary on GenCorr and for continuing the discussion.

So as to keep this reply short, I'll stick my substantive response in the next combox. Here I'll ask, how you would formulate an argument about motion in the First Way from what you have cited. I'm guessing you are arguing that we should suppose that Aquinas means "motion" in the First Way to include change in substance, but if you hold something else, please say what it is. And if I've gotten your conclusion correctly, do you want to argue for this interpretative move?

Cheers, f

 

12/22/2017 11:37 am  #12


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

@bmiller: hello here is more of a response to yours. 

I suggest the issue includes one of methodology in interpretation: what evidence is needed for a claim that an author means to assert P in a passage where he does not state P? I.e. how to get from Aquinas' prologue to his comm on Gen/Corr to his meaning in the First Way.


I see at least five questions, or something like these, about gen/corr and motion (kinesis): 
a. what did Aristotle hold at what place in his writings?
b. do today’s scientists and/or philosophers think his conclusions correct?
c. what did Aquinas think Aristotle meant in this or that passage?
d. what did Aquinas understand by "motion" in the First Way?
e. do today’s scientists and philosophers think his conclusions correct?

I'll only try to reply re a. and c.

a. We've agreed previously that Aristotle speaks of gen /corr as "motions" in places in GC, esp. at the outset. As he goes along in Bk. I, he distinguishes between genesis "simply" and genesis, or change coming to be, "with respect to a part", I.3, 317b35. This distinction is repeated at 318a28-29 and elaborated in the ensuing lines, so that "the way into not being simplicter is simple destruction, and the way into being simpliciter is generation.” This distinction then gets cashed out as genesis/destruction simply on one hand and gen/corr of a certain kind on the other. The latter amounts to locomotion, alteration and growth/decay (319a12). Thus there are four changes, “metabolai”: gen/corr, loco, alt, growth/decay. In I.4, the distinction between change in substance and change in quality (eidos), or alteration, is set out somewhat more precisely, but not as clearly as in Physics V ff. As Hans Joachim says in his commentary on GC, “Aristotle’s usual practice is to draw a sharp distinction between the three [here follows Greek, which I translate] forms of motion (kinesis) (alteration, growth/decay and locomotion) and generation and corruption, and to use the term “change” (metabole) to cover all forms of change (i.e. genesis and corruption as well as the three species of kinesis)… But this practice is by no means invariable (94-95) … But linguistic usage appears to conflict with the theory (98).”
     At I.4 319b6-18, Aristotle sets out the theoretical basis of his distinction between gen/corr and other kinds of change. Alteration is a change in an attribute of a substrate/subject, when the subject remains and is perceptible, and the change is between contraries or intermediates, as in becoming healthy from sick, or bronze’s being shaped differently. When the entire substance changes and the subject does not remain, as when all the semen becomes blood or all the water becomes air, this is genesis or destruction.
     Note that the argument to support the distinction betw gen/corr and the other changes is the same argument as we get in Physics V: that alteration etc is between contraries or intermediates, but change of substance, gen/corr, is between contradictories. In Phys Ari adds the reason: that a substance does not have a contrary, only a contradictory (a man can be destroyed into not-man, but there is no contrary of man). That argument appears in shorter form in De Caelo IV.3, 310a22-29. There Ari says that there are other geneseis and changes (metabolas), but since there are three motions, we see that in each of them there is a change that occurs from opposites to opposites and intermediate stages.
    By the end of GenCorr , Ari sets genesis and kinesis parallel as though they are different (318a-b), but he does not spell this out. He continues to try to show that motion is also a condition for change of substance, since something moves in place when a subject is generated or destroyed, and prime matter—not a substance, of course--remains as a substrate. The best I can do at this point is to think that Ari has the conception in GenCorr of the distinction between gen/corr and what he elsewhere calls “motion in the strict sense.” But he does not harmonize his terminology completely between this work and the latter part of the Physics or the summary in De Caelo.
 
c. Aquinas himself only commented on Book I of the GenCorr. When he gets to passages like those above, he does make clear that on Ari’s view, there is a difference betw change of subject, “simple” gen/corr, and changes of properties of a subject. The section numbers differ in this translation from the section numbers in the Latin. But cf. e.g. from lectio 2:
“12. He says therefore first [11] that all the philosophers who assert that all things are produced from one material principle are forced to say that generation and corruption are the same as alteration. [snip] Now we say that a thing is altered when, with the substance of the thing in act remaining, some variation occurs with respect to the form. Hence it follows that there can be no change called simple generation and corruption, but only alteration.
We, on the other hand, declare that there is of all generable and corruptible things one first subject, which, however, is not a being in act but in potency. Therefore when its first subject acquires a form through which it becomes a being in act, this is called simple generation. But it is said to be altered when, after being made a being in act, it acquires any additional form.”
From lectio 10:
 “79. Then [76] he shows, from the side of the subject, how generation differs from alteration and from other changes.
First, he shows how all of them are related to the subject which is a being in act;
Secondly, how related to the subject which is a being in potency, at 81.
He says therefore first [76] that, as was said, alteration is according to the passions of something that remains. And this same thing occurs in other changes, which take place with respect to accidents which occur to a subject existing in act. When, therefore, a change is from contrary to contrary according to quantity — for example, from large to small, or vice versa — we have "growth" or "decrease" of the same permanent subject, since quantity occurs to a subject existing in act. But when the change is with respect to contrariety of place — for example, up or down — it is "latio," i.e., local motion, of the same remaining body, since "where" accrues to a body existing in act. When the change is with respect to a contrariety in passions (i.e., primarily in passible qualities, and in other qualities as a consequence), we have "alteration" of the same permanent being, because quality too accrues to a subject existing in act. But when nothing remains existing in act, of which that which is changed might be a passion or some accident, it is universally "generation and corruption," since the substantial form, with respect to which generation and corruption occur, does not accrue to a subject existing in act.”
 
This is all I’ll cite, since this post is already too long. I think it’s clear that despite Ari’s terminological issues, his distinction between change in substance and change in attributes is clear in Gen Corr. And I think it’s clear that Aquinas recognizes it. It refers to the same bifurcation among changes as does Ari's distinction between species of kinesis vs. gen/corr.
 

Last edited by ficino (12/22/2017 12:27 pm)

     Thread Starter
 

12/22/2017 12:15 pm  #13


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

I'm inclined to agree that the generation or corruption of substantial form is not a motion: the former is a state of rest in its own nature/ being while the latter is not a subject of motion; whereas heating or cooling, say, are obviously motions aa the subject is understood to be one and the same (as, of course, with something moving locally).


"The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State."
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (3).

Defend your Family. Join the U.N. Family Rights Caucus.
 

12/22/2017 1:13 pm  #14


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

Dominican Thomist, Thomas of Sutton (c. 1250-1315) in Part 2 of his On the Plurality of Forms expounds Aristotle's bifurcation of change into generation/corruption vs. kinds of alteration. Among the arguments he gives, Sutton summarizes two of Ari's arguments: that the subject does not persist in a change of substance; that motion is between contraries or intermediates, but gen/corr is between contradictories, since a substance has no contrary, so that gen/corr is not motion.  I haven't found a translation, but the Latin is here:

http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/xpf0.html

Last edited by ficino (12/22/2017 1:16 pm)

     Thread Starter
 

12/22/2017 2:10 pm  #15


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

@ficino,

ficino wrote:

The best I can do at this point is to think that Ari has the conception in GenCorr of the distinction between gen/corr and what he elsewhere calls “motion in the strict sense.” But he does not harmonize his terminology completely between this work and the latter part of the Physics or the summary in De Caelo.
 

Right.   That was my point.  He uses the term differently in different works.  Some attribute that to him changing his views over time and failing to go back and correct his earlier works.  But others disagree.

Here for instance:


https://books.google.com/books?id=avyOpyOYCskC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=chronological+order+of+aristotle%27s+works&source=bl&ots=6Z5HvjPd1D&sig=Ui9IEtMLuL82-NXpquDmHmRYSBg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwis_sv8n57YAhXqllQKHSQQAfUQ6AEIZzAJ#v=onepage&q=chronological%20order%20of%20aristotle's%20works&f=false

ficino wrote:

 
c. what did Aquinas think Aristotle meant in this or that passage?
 

I don't have any arguments here.  His commentaries are easily available.

I think most people have an issue with your insistance that Aquinas limited himself solely to Aristotle's concepts regarding the First Way.

Here I'll ask, how you would formulate an argument about motion in the First Way from what you have cited. I'm guessing you are arguing that we should suppose that Aquinas means "motion" in the First Way to include change in substance, but if you hold something else, please say what it is. 

I'm merely pointing out that Aristotle used the term "motion" in different senses and in some cases it included generation and corruption.  I am not using the quote I provided to conclude the First Way includes change in substance as a basic premise of the argument.  Personally, I think the First Way makes the argument from the 3 varieties of motion common to existing material things.

However, in the SCG he elaborates on the distinction between violent and natural motion and describes natural motion as being due to the form of the object and the form of the object being due to the generator of the object.  Aquinas differed from Aristotle by distinguishing between essense and existence and the requirement for God to hold the 2 together.  So naturally, the form and matter of an existing object would require God to keep it in existence in order for it move naturally.  

Also, I think you assume that when Feser begins an argument with motion and then talks about essence and existence he is somehow making a hash of the First Way when a) he is not necessarily limiting himself to the First Way unless he is explicit about it and  b) material objects cannot move unless they first exist, so although they require a first mover, they also require something that generates and sustains them.
 

 

12/22/2017 3:07 pm  #16


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

Well, while Aquinas did explicitly differentiate between essence and existence, Aristotle did say that things have their being through their essence. Hence if anything essential to a thing's being is negated it ceases to exist.


"The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State."
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (3).

Defend your Family. Join the U.N. Family Rights Caucus.
 

12/22/2017 5:51 pm  #17


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

bmiller wrote:

Some attribute that to him changing his views over time and failing to go back and correct his earlier works.  But others disagree.

The late Helen Lang was certainly at the top of the game. I have used her writings with profit. You'll notice that when she contests the influence that developmental schemes can have on interpreting Aristotle, it's because they can detract from our attention to what the arguments are doing in the work in question. The passages I submitted from the GenCorr show him giving an argument on which it follows from his own principles that gen/corr are not motions because they are not changes from contrary to contrary. But so far you have not put forth and analyzed arguments in Aristotle by which he might have sought to demonstrate that gen/corr are motions. The takeaway from passages where Ari merely lumps gen/corr with other terms under the heading "motion" seems less than that from passages where he goes through an argument for a conclusion. 


 

I think most people have an issue with your insistance that Aquinas limited himself solely to Aristotle's concepts regarding the First Way.

Then those people have not read what I wrote. I am insisting that we do not have a warrant to conclude that Aquinas does include gen/corr as motions in the First Way. That's different from an assertive claim that he does not include them. It might turn out that he meant to include them, but I see no positive indication that stands up to analysis, and there are a lot of considerations against such a conclusion. So as I said before, I think it's prudent not to read in something that we can't show is there and for which we have good reason to deny is there.

You can still argue for the UM from alteration and growth/decay, wherever one comes out on locomotion.

I'm merely pointing out that Aristotle used the term "motion" in different senses and in some cases it included generation and corruption.

  OK, yes, and it follows that ...?

Also, I think you assume that when Feser begins an argument with motion and then talks about essence and existence he is somehow making a hash of the First Way when a) he is not necessarily limiting himself to the First Way unless he is explicit about it and  b) material objects cannot move unless they first exist, so although they require a first mover, they also require something that generates and sustains them.
 

I've said that Feser himself says he offers the above as a rational reconstruction, and there are critics who disagree. So Feser's exit point in DDC and denial of EI may be implicit in the Ways but is not stated in them. 

I'd appreciate it if people are more careful in how they use the word "assume." I'm not assuming the above. I am just not assenting so far to Feser's reconstruction, for certain reasons. I use assumptions as much as the next guy, but I think there is a more charitable way describe another person's thought than to say precipitously that the person is (merely?) assuming. But no big deal. I appreciate your pushing me more into the gen/corr question.
 

     Thread Starter
 

12/22/2017 7:39 pm  #18


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

You've been told repeatedly that Feser does not deny EI. Pay absolutely no attention to SP if you don't want to look foolish.

Feser in no way fundamentally changes the First Way. He doesn't collapse it into the second way because he remains primarily concerned with the distinction between act and potency. This is,again, also why all this exegesis about what counts as motion is irrelevant. The first way begins with observed motion and then moves to the concepts of act and potency. 

 

12/22/2017 9:10 pm  #19


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

@ficino,

"OK, yes, and it follows that ...?"

It follows that I disagree with your hypothesis that Aristotle's inclusion of generation and corruption in the category of motion was merely an early notion he rejected in later more mature writings.  I agree with Helen Lang that he included it when the topic called for it.  

In fact, Aquinas uses the generating cause as proof that everything that is moved is moved by another in the SCG while explaining the reasoning behind the First Way.

Book 1 chapter 13

[8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the proposition by induction [Physics VIII, 4]. Whatever is moved by accident is not moved by itself, since it is moved upon the motion of another. So, too, as is evident, what is moved by violence is not moved by itself. Nor are those beings moved by themselves that are moved by their nature as being moved from within; such is the case with animals, which evidently are moved by the soul. Nor, again, is this true of those beings, such as heavy and light bodies, which are moved through nature. For such beings are moved by the generating cause and the cause removing impediments. Now, whatever is moved is moved through itself or by accident. If it is moved through itself, then it is moved either violently or by nature; if by nature, then either through itself, as the animal, or not through itself, as heavy and light bodies. Therefore, everything that is moved is moved by another.

Aquinas considers the generating cause the ultimate cause of a certain class of present motion and argues this point in his explanation of the First Way.  So things are only in motion as long as the generating cause is active.  So the generating cause must be acting in the present moment.  So divine conservation is considered part of the explanation of the First Way by Aquinas.

"I'd appreciate it if people are more careful in how they use the word "assume." I'm not assuming the above. "

I mentioned that I thought you were assuming Feser was limiting his discussion to the First Way.  That is how it looked to me.  After all you complained earlier that he brought contingency into his explanation after starting to talk about motion, as if he should not mix the 2 ways in the same explanation.
  
I accept that you no longer consider Feser to discussing only the First Way.

But I also agree with Jeremy, that Aquinas considers all real change as change from potency to act and that real change requires an unchanged changer.  Do you disagree?

 

12/22/2017 9:28 pm  #20


Re: Are generation and corruption "motions" in A-T?

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

You've been told repeatedly that Feser does not deny EI. Pay absolutely no attention to SP if you don't want to look foolish.

Feser in no way fundamentally changes the First Way. He doesn't collapse it into the second way because he remains primarily concerned with the distinction between act and potency. This is,again, also why all this exegesis about what counts as motion is irrelevant. The first way begins with observed motion and then moves to the concepts of act and potency. 

I wrote a pacific reply, and then I said to myself, this forum is a joke. I thought there were people here who were interested in discussing writings of classical theists. But no one or almost no one wants to do anything scholarly on here. This place is a claque-pit for Feser. I'm done. 

 

     Thread Starter
 

Board footera

 

Powered by Boardhost. Create a Free Forum